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Lingering Borders in the European 
Union: Migrant Workers in Spain 
and the Netherlands
Andra Bos¸neag
The fall of the Berlin Wall…more or less completely changed 
the nature of the EU, giving rise to identity problems that still 
remain unresolved—and indeed were reflected by the refusal 
of the proposed EU constitution by the people of France and the 
Netherlands.1
Anthony Giddens, 2007
I. Introduction
With the two European Union (EU) Enlargements of 2004 and 
2007, an understanding of the antiquated and modern challenges, fears, 
and contradictions surrounding the inclusion of accession countries, as 
well as the respective rights of the “old” member states, has become 
essential to any contemporary analysis of current EU dynamics. This 
work incorporates my two semesters abroad in Barcelona, Spain, and 
Maastricht, the Netherlands, with the intended approach of further 
clarifying the Program’s mission: “intensive interrogation and observa-
tion of globalization in comparative perspective.” Before embarking on 
my study abroad, I was profoundly marked by an incident that solidi-
fied my resolution to study Eastern and Central Europe. In an effort 
to skip the bureaucratic visa process, I attempted to use my Roma-
nian passport instead of my American passport to enter Europe. After 
inquiring at five different Spanish embassies as to whether my Roma-
nian passport, after EU accession, would eliminate the need for a visa, 
I left the country still not knowing if my passport was yet functional in 
the realm of the European Union. Upon entering Spain, a border patrol 
officer enthusiastically informed me that the EU required no entry 
papers (besides a passport) for its citizens studying abroad; my Roma-
nian passport had ceased to be just a sentimental souvenir. This inci-
dent was one of many that attested to the lack of general knowledge 
surrounding the new EU members and it contributed to my decision 
to study the interactions between the old and new member states. Fur-
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thermore, both Spain and the Netherlands have generally been viewed 
as “different.” While Franco’s authoritarian regime emphasized the 
popular slogan, “España es diferente,” it is currently employed as a tac-
tic to garner tourists. In contrast, the political and cultural dynamics 
of the Netherlands have traditionally been perceived as anomalous in 
their liberalism, compelling many to label the country as “different.”
This case study further problematizes and deepens previous studies 
by addressing the post-Enlargement period of the EU, a period that has 
yet to feel the effects of the post-modern academic discourse and rheto-
ric of grandiose proportions. While the 2004 and 2007 accession peri-
ods acquired massive media attention and produced a considerable 
number of studies, the post-Enlargement period has failed to generate 
any such attention. In addition to observing the idiosyncrasies of the 
European Union, this study centers upon the situation of migrant labor 
within the modern context of globalization and the present implica-
tions this global force presupposes for transitory migrant fluctuations 
of labor. More specifically, I intend to address two diverse popula-
tions, the Romanians and the Poles, and the significant changes that 
materialized in the social spheres of the receiving countries, Spain and 
the Netherlands, respectively, given that these spaces were previously 
associated with the predominant national fears of mass migration, job 
loss, and various levels of cultural animosity toward migrants.
Section II of this study provides a general overview of the implica-
tions of the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargements, focusing primarily on 
labor transition periods. The third section explicates the situation of 
the two migrant groups by addressing general migration, highlighting 
cases of temporary labor migration, and assessing the post-Enlarge-
ment situation regarding fears of mass migration, job loss, and cultural 
threats. Section IV touches upon the forces of globalization within this 
context.
In approaching the study of globalization in comparative perspec-
tive, three final points must be addressed. First, contradictions form 
an essential component of this study, just as the multiplicity of forces 
and contradictions is part of globalization. The dynamics of globaliza-
tion predicate and insist upon the simultaneous integration and frag-
mentation of people, identities, and concepts. Through globalization’s 
partner concept, “glocalization,” the local becomes ever transformed 
into the global, while the global suddenly mirrors the local.2 Secondly, 
a definition of globalization, however compressed and oversimplified, 
proves indispensable to a general understanding of any EU discussion. 
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Anthony Giddens succinctly sums up this process as the “intensifica-
tion of worldwide social relations both local and distant.”3 Former 
Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, offers a more eco-
nomically based definition of the phenomenon: “closer economic inte-
gration of the countries of the world through the increased flow of 
goods and services and capital, or even labor.”4 Thirdly, although this 
study does not focus upon the local, regional, national, or transna-
tional attitudes of immigrants or nationals (due to the difficulties in 
compiling and comparatively interpreting these diverse opinions), the 
research was somewhat hindered by the scarcity of available infor-
mation sources, such as opinion polls. However, I have attempted to 
overcome these challenges through the realization of several personal 
interviews and numerous informal discussions in Spain, the Neth-
erlands, and Romania. These “snapshots” provide invaluable and 
intimate insights, as they highlight the profound challenges and con-
tradictions that migrant workers encounter.
A. European Union
Originally constructed in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, primarily as an economic agreement negotiated between the 
two countries of France and Germany, the European Union and its 
six founding members have since extended membership to 27 states. 
Apparent in the institution’s common market, trade policy, and free-
dom of movement of people and goods, the members demonstrate con-
sistent unity and communication about the Union’s goals.5 Despite this 
connectedness, however, there exist several key platforms on which the 
member states are unable to compromise. Given the unwillingness to 
reassign “decision-making authority in general and migration-related 
issues in particular to the supranational level,”6 many of the nation-
states feel a pressure that impedes them from fully cooperating with 
their fellow members. The contentious issue of migration, one that has 
received much scrutiny over the last few years, has proven particu-
larly controversial for the EU as the “issue of mobile, ‘uncontrollable’ 
people…currently causes a great deal of intense, sometimes phobic, 
political and public debate in the member states.”7 In particular, the 
EU features a basic inconsistency between diminishing internal bor-
ders while strengthening external borders. The result has come to be 
known as “fortress Europe,” or the lesser invoked “gated community” 
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(which, in contrast to the former, still permits the passage of margin-
ally desired migrants).8
Migration has taken priority as a poignant issue for the new mem-
ber states involved in the latest Enlargements because their internal 
borders face the issue of labor transition agreements that obstruct the 
free movement of labor, but which decidedly allow the almost contra-
dictory free movement of people. With the consequent opening of spe-
cific work sectors of the labor market, older member states sacrificed 
a fundamental EU citizenship right (the freedom of labor) with the 
purpose of safeguarding national labor markets and welfare mecha-
nisms.9 This decision led to numerous problematic discussions and 
repercussions regarding permanent and temporary migrant workers, 
particularly those from Poland and Romania. Prior to the 2004 Euro-
pean Union Enlargement, Polish migrants made headlines as fears 
of mass migrations and social dumping inundating the labor mar-
ket resonated throughout Western Europe. Most notably, these fears 
became personified by the Polish plumber in France, the emblematic 
figure of cheap labor originating from Central Europe. Following the 
subsequent 2007 Enlargement, the public anxiety originally focused on 
Poland was transferred to Romania, a country predicted to have mass 
migration due to the substantial differences between its lower GDP 
per capita and those of older member states, as well as its established 
migrant routes to countries like Spain and Italy.10
II. Enlargement
To better contextualize the modern-day challenges of migrant workers, 
an understanding of the Enlargement process is essential. The acces-
sion negotiations for both Poland and Romania started soon after the 
fall of communism in 1989 as a way of embracing the West as portrayed 
by the European Union. After an arduous process of complying with 
thousands of pages of the acquis communautaire, these countries were 
finally allowed to “return to Europe.” Interestingly enough, Poland 
and Romania had never ceased to take ownership of their imagined 
status as Europeans; however, it was only after accession that the older 
member states were willing to award these countries official status in 
the European community. The 2004 Enlargement was memorable not 
only as the largest in the Union’s history but also for its inclusion of 
countries outside of Western Europe. Poland, along with nine other 
countries, successfully completed the Copenhagen criteria and gained 
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access to funds and incentives that would further promote security and 
economic stability in the country. Romania joined in 2007, along with 
Bulgaria, in a smaller but equally remarkable enlargement due in part 
to the discrepancy between the economies of the new member states 
and the old member states’ more modern economic reasoning.11
A. Labor Transition Periods
Of the many benefits the EU strives to offer its member states, the pan-
European labor market is perhaps the most significant. According to 
Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome, the “freedom of movement of work-
ers shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on national-
ity between workers of the member states as regards employment.”12 
Although Poland and Romania took pride in their status as official 
member states, their inclusion did not entail the freedom of movement 
enjoyed by other member states. Despite the fact that Western Europe 
is facing aging societies and worker shortages, most governments and 
their media chose to focus on the fear of mass migration and cheap 
labor inundating their labor markets. As a result, almost all of the 
member states decided to implement three-year labor transition peri-
ods13 for the 2004 Enlargement.
Poland finished its transition period in 2007, having accessed the 
majority of the EU labor markets. However, some member states, 
including the Netherlands, opted to extend the three-year transition 
periods to 2009 in order to ensure that their labor markets would not 
be overwhelmed by a massive influx of migrants.14 These limitations 
did not apply to the desirable highly-skilled labor in sectors facing 
major shortages. Instead, they predominantly restricted the movement 
of low-skilled labor (the only exception pertained to seasonal agricul-
tural labor).
Romania will tentatively complete its three-year transition period in 
2009, along with Bulgaria. Similar to the previous accession, the transi-
tion period may be extended for two more years, according to each indi-
vidual member state.15 Presently members are reviewing their policies 
toward Romania and Bulgaria. Countries such as Spain are planning 
to terminate the transition period in 2009, without further extensions. 
In addition, some members have already signed and implemented 
bilateral labor agreements,16 however other member states have shown 
themselves willing to further extend their labor transition periods in 
hopes of avoiding an increase in migrants.17 Paradoxically, in denying 
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workers access to the labor market, “domestic political considerations 
on the EU side overrode the principles of the single market; that is, 
high politics overturned policy paradigms that were well established 
within the Union.”18 This was possible because:
[F]ear of mass migration stretches beyond fear of job loss and social ben-
efit misuse. Being assumed to pursue ‘evil’ agendas of collective action 
(stealing away ‘our’ jobs, shopping the welfare system), immigrants are 
accused of threatening the moral proper order. They challenge the invis-
ible lines wrapped around that order, which, with some sense of imagi-
nation, may be called society’s moral boundaries.19
The asymmetrical power relations between the old and new member 
states placed the latter in a position of subordination that allowed the 
former to take such action; however, the old member states attempted 
to alleviate these decisions by “making additional concessions in other 
negotiating chapters.”20 In an attempt to rationalize their decisions, 
their fears of mass migration had been “thinly veiled by justifications 
of consistent policymaking or diplomatic fairness.”21 One such justifi-
cation was the use of migration forecasts through which governments 
sought to create order out of a complicated, chaotic situation. In her 
article, “Problematizing the ‘Orderly’ Aesthetic Assumptions of Fore-
casts of East-West Migration in the European Union,” Roos Pijpers 
describes the members’ desire for aesthetic socio-spatial order. She 
describes the “latent desire to order and structure social space”22 being 
satisfied by these migration forecasts since they offer “visible, almost 
tangible proofs that immigration restricting measures are necessary to 
secure this order.”23 However, it is noteworthy that:
The forecaster and the policy maker or politician each attaches different 
values and meanings to numbers. Whereas the former may experience 
aesthetic quality when successfully carrying out a demanding meth-
odological challenge, the latter has the difficult task of communicating 
artificial certainty to influential claims-making actors in parliament and 
society.24
During the last two Enlargements, governments used these migra-
tion forecasts as justification for their actions. This knowledge con-
trasts with the fact that despite the large populations of Eastern and 
Central European migrants within countries such as the Netherlands, 
the numbers forecasted were not alarming.25 During the first Enlarge-
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ment, research has determined that, “the size and impact of migration 
flows does vary from Member state to Member State and [was] not 
necessarily determined by the degree of restrictions imposed.”26 States 
like Germany and Austria saw an increase in immigration while oth-
ers, such as the United Kingdom, received the forecasted number of 
immigrants. Yet these were not directly correlated with the degree 
of openness exhibited by the member state towards migrant work-
ers. The implementation of labor transition periods for these countries 
was proof that both Bulgaria and Romania were “less favorably per-
ceived.”27 This was in part due to the greater inequality between the 
two countries’ GDPs and those of the old member states, in addition 
to “publicly held beliefs about Bulgaria and Romania’s inclinations 
toward organized crime and corruption.”28 Not only the governments 
of member states, but also the media, focused on the paranoia and 
enforcement of stereotypical views of Eastern Europe, implying that 
geographical proximity does not ensure knowledge of a neighboring 
region.29
III. Case Studies
A. The Polish in the Netherlands
Traditionally labeled as the most socially and culturally open country 
in Europe, the Netherlands has witnessed several waves of immigra-
tion in the last century. The influx started with the Moluccans, inhabit-
ants of the Indonesian islands, who had fought alongside the Dutch 
in the KNIL, the Royal Dutch East Indies Army.30 The Moluccans relo-
cated to the Netherlands starting in the 1940s as part of a temporary 
program during which they were not supposed to work or be inte-
grated into Dutch society. However, most of them remained after the 
temporary program was dismantled.31 During the decades of the 1960s 
and the ’70s, migrant workers were sought from both Turkey and 
Morocco. This group was also seen as temporary; they were expected 
to return home when their labor services were no longer required.32 
Again, most chose to remain and family unification later followed. The 
last great wave involved migrants from Surinam and the Netherlands 
Antilles, carriers of Dutch passports.33
Internally, the Dutch nationals were divided and utilized the tradi-
tional Polder system. This arrangement ensured that liberals, conserva-
tives, Catholics, and Protestants were enclosed within their own system, 
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with their leaders benefiting from interactions as they attempted to 
negotiate with other branches.34 The lack of interactions between 
groups of ordinary citizens can also be seen within current immigrant 
societies.35 While larger cities like Amsterdam and The Hague boast a 
high percentage of immigrants, one is immediately struck by the vastly 
homogenous populations of most Dutch cities. It is predominantly in 
the outskirts that one encounters people from diverse backgrounds. 
This, in turn, had led to rare interactions between immigrants and 
nationals, and lower levels of integration into Dutch society.
Despite its continued liberal stance on soft drugs, prostitution, and 
gay marriage, the Netherlands has witnessed a change in its liberal 
attitude toward immigration in recent years, as it is proving difficult 
to define a Dutch national identity. In 2007, for example, Princess Max-
ima, wife of the Dutch Crown Prince, controversially declared that, 
“a typical Dutch person doesn’t exist.”36 Director Theo Van Gogh’s 
shocking murder in 2004 served as a catalyst in shifting the country’s 
ideological stance towards all immigrants. Even second- and third-
generation immigrants started being considered outsiders, threatening 
“the identity of the Dutch nation, Dutch history and culture as a part of 
the history of Western civilization.”37 Consequently, the citizens of the 
Netherlands slowly started supporting more radical politicians like the 
late Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, politicians that manipulated the 
presence of new immigrants, comprised mainly of Moroccans, in order 
to pursue their own political agendas.
Actions (such as Rita Verdonk’s enforcement of a stricter visa sys-
tem) that aim at integration and assimilation have meant alienation and 
an “othering” directed especially at non-European migrant groups. 
The new visa system has introduced a 350 Euro Integration Test, which 
must be taken before coming to the Netherlands. It is rendered difficult 
because it oftentimes proves problematic to obtain Dutch language 
training abroad.38 Additionally, the test has been:
justified in the parliamentary discussions with reference to the idea that 
young Dutchmen of Moroccan and Turkish origin should look for a 
spouse in the Netherlands rather than for spouses in their country of 
origin because this would continue problems with integration, as the 
minister has formulated it.39
Although most of the rhetoric surrounds issues regarding non-
Europeans, European migrants have also been targeted because they 
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are seen as outsiders who may potentially pose a threat to Dutch liber-
alism. One of these migrant groups is the Polish. The Eastern European 
population in the Netherlands is estimated to be around 100,000, the 
majority (80%) being Polish.40 Although the Polish comprise a small 
minority in the Netherlands, they are nevertheless the primary foreign 
group associated with fears of job loss. This anxiety is best described 
as a result of the “(ir)rationality and political opportunism [that] meet 
in perception of this particular flow of labor migration as a cause for 
contemporary moral panic.”41 An important characteristic of the Poles 
is the inner distinction between German Poles and Polish Poles. The 
former group is from the Prussian region of Silesia. Many have been 
utilizing their German passport to do migrant work in the Netherlands 
for several months at a time since the establishment of the European 
Community.42
1. Asparagus Harvest
The Dutch consider white asparagus a delicacy and every year in May 
and June they eagerly await this prized harvest. Signs and pictures 
of white asparagus abound in restaurants and grocery stores, par-
ticularly in the regions of Limburg and Brabant.43 Traditionally, the 
German Poles have been the primary harvesters, known for their will-
ingness to work long hours and accept cheaper pay.44 With the advent 
of Enlargement, Polish Poles also provided a substantial minority of 
migrant workers, although this group had participated in the harvest 
for some years, at times using illegal migration methods.45 In the wake 
of Enlargement, the situation could be described as “between fear and 
need.”46 While it was feared initially that the migrants would take 
away jobs from nationals, it gave way to the realization that the Dutch 
were unwilling to take these jobs. Considering that the three percent 
of Dutch nationals that are currently unemployed in the Netherlands47 
would not have taken part in the agricultural sector anyway, the Poles 
do not seem to be acquiring any desired jobs.48
There have not been a myriad of efforts on the part of the gov-
ernments of the Netherlands and Poland for collaboration regarding 
the migrant workers. Labor unions provide the most outreach in the 
Netherlands. Several of them have visited Poland on numerous occa-
sions in hopes of actualizing dialogue among migrant workers. One 
of the most substantial aspects of these visits has been the crackdown 
on illegal work agencies,49 as this has been one of the main problems 
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affecting migrant workers. In fact, illegal work agencies in Poland out-
number legal ones.50 These agencies sign up people with farmers in 
the Netherlands, at times not producing any results (yet acquiring the 
fees), and at other times failing to clearly explain the rules and regu-
lations. The migrant workers come to the Netherlands, sign papers 
in a language they do not understand, and may be forced to work in 
miserable conditions, leading some to refer to the harvest as “hell on 
earth.”51 The visits of labor unions to Poland uncovered many frauds, 
leading to more legal transactions and better working conditions.52
Within the asparagus harvest, two new issues have emerged, start-
ing with the rising market value of agricultural employees. As the 
Polish migrant situation became increasingly legalized through more 
ample inspections and larger cumulative fines,53 Dutch farmers began 
to apprehend the value of their employees, work conditions started 
to improve, and the Poles became a respected part of the harvest. The 
second change points to the growing overseas competition of agricul-
tural prices that has yielded lower profits, rendering future harvests 
uncertain. In her study, Mutual Dependency of the Farmers and Polish 
Asparagus Migrants, Roos Pijpers problematizes the future of the aspar-
agus harvest since these jobs are not seen as permanent by the Polish 
migrant workers, but rather as the bottom rung on the ladder to future 
employment.54
In his “Poland is Europe” speech, Dutch Prime Minister Balkenede 
clearly states the importance and permanence that the Poles have been 
acquiring in Dutch society by saying, “we need the Poles.”55 As some 
migrants have decided to move back to Poland following improved 
conditions and new jobs, the Dutch are starting to outwardly voice 
concerns that their Polish migrant labor is declining. Piet Hein Donner, 
the Social Affairs Minister, concedes the housing concerns but argues 
that, “we would have much more of a problem on the labour market 
if the Poles weren’t here.”56 This is in sharp contrast to the statement 
made by the Dutch Minister of Finance in declaring “himself to be 
‘against cheap Poles”’ during Enlargement talks.57 Poles are starting to 
be prized for their skills in Dutch society as they “have the reputation 
of working very hard and delivering quality workmanship.”58
Although the cultural threats posed by the Polish were never as 
significant as the economic threats, they are noteworthy because some 
migrant workers are staying for up to ten years, while others are per-
manently settling in the Netherlands.59 The “othering” aspect present 
between the Polish migrant workers and the Dutch is the result of 
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actions invoked by both groups. On one hand, the Dutch view the 
Poles as foreigners while on the other hand, the Polish themselves 
sometimes disassociate from Dutch society. Consistent with many 
immigrant societies, the Polish create a safe haven by maintaining 
close relationships with fellow immigrants in cities and towns with 
substantial Polish populations. This is especially true as migrant work-
ers “rarely engage in no-work-related social interactions with receiv-
ing country residents.”60 In some cases, they do not have time to learn 
the language or interact with Dutch society after a 12-hour workday.61 
If they are only in the Netherlands for the asparagus season, those few 
months do not evoke a sense of urgency in learning Dutch or acquiring 
visibility in Dutch society. However, things are starting to change as 
more permanent migrant workers are settling. One welcoming aspect 
of longer-term and permanent Polish migrants is visible in churches 
throughout the countryside. Catholic churches experiencing prolonged 
membership decline are now seeing increased numbers of churchgoers 
as the Polish are using the existing religious framework for support. 
Some churches are even hiring Polish clergy.62
A new trend that has gone largely unnoticed is the movement of 
Polish migrant workers to the Netherlands from other member states, 
predominantly Germany and England.63 At present, Germany is expe-
riencing a shortage of asparagus workers as a greater number of them 
elect to work in the Netherlands. This is due to the Netherlands’ offer 
of higher wages at the cost of only a slight change in geographical 
proximity. Conversely, England offers a higher salary than the Neth-
erlands but, due to the higher standard of living and greater distance, 
some Poles are choosing the Netherlands.64 Whatever country they 
arrive from, the Polish have usually been treated as strangers.
B. Romanians in Spain
The streets of major Spanish cities, such as Barcelona, abound with 
North Africans selling faux designer bags, Pakistani immigrants keep-
ing their shops open on Sunday and during the “sacred” siesta, and 
Asian women in broken Spanish offering 5€ massages on the beach. 
This same bustle can also be seen in smaller cities in Spain; one does 
not need to go to the outskirts to see ethnic and racial diversity, one can 
see it in the faces of its visitors and citizens and hear it in the languages 
they speak. It is in these circumstances that Romanians are establish-
ing themselves as Spain’s largest minority. These images are in stark 
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contrast to Spain during its dictatorial era. Starting in 1943, Francisco 
Franco subjected Spain to imposed marginalization, turning the coun-
try into Europe’s southern periphery for the next 36 years. Plagued 
by significant unemployment and inflation rates, Spain seemed an 
improbable candidate for EU candidacy in the 1980s; however, it 
swiftly situated itself from “pariah to partner of the EU.”65
Internally, Spain cultivated multiple identities as its internal struc-
ture permitted autonomous regions—especially those of Catalonia, 
the Basque lands, and Galicia—which later proclaimed themselves as 
nations within a nation. Although the country was isolated from the 
rest of Europe and lacked a sizeable migrant population, it was not 
homogenous. Its regions were required to interact to a greater level 
than in the Dutch polder system.
Under the Aznar government (1996–2004), Spain enacted one of the 
EU’s toughest immigration laws, la Ley de Extranjeria, culminating 
in “one of the lowest percentages of foreigners among the EU mem-
ber states” as late as 2004.66 Then a change in government and the 
economy altered Spain’s status from a country that exported migrant 
workers to one that imported them.67 Although it has been argued that 
economic prosperity is not correlated with the perception of immi-
grants,68 Spain’s prosperity as a result of its immigrants cannot be 
denied. Taking minimum-wage positions and unwanted agricultural 
jobs, immigrants are now seen as indispensable. By 2007, three million 
of the country’s population was comprised of foreigners, accounting 
for 11% of the 44 million people living in Spain.
The new government partially responsible for this change was the 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, the PSOE. Upon gaining leadership 
of the government, its main candidate, Jose Luis Zapatero, became 
Prime Minister and is currently serving his second term. Zapatero has 
made several bold moves by withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq, 
legalizing gay marriage, negotiating with the Basque Separatist move-
ment (ETA), and commitments regarding reform and immigration. 
He granted legal status to more than one million migrants who could 
prove that they were currently employed in Spain.69 As a result, lead-
ers of other member states chastised him for his lenient immigration 
policies that would in turn affect their own states. The main opposition 
party, the Popular Party, is led by Mariano Rajoy and is “very keen to 
push for stricter immigration laws” in opposition not only to the PSOE 
but also to civil society, and particularly the Church (which is not what 
it used to be since most Spaniards now consider themselves Atheist 
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Catholic, but the Church continues to play a part in their daily lives).70 
Prior to accession, Spain feared the Enlargement as it would “shift the 
EU’s economic center of gravity, and [bring] in new members whose 
interests are mostly different from those of the Mediterranean coun-
tries in general and Spain in particular.”71 However, Spain had and 
continues to maintain a strong economy that stands to benefit from 
migrants in general. Currently exhibiting the “best-performing major 
economy [in Europe], with growth averaging 3.1 percent over the past 
five years,” the country has created half of the new jobs in the Euro-
pean Union since 2002. In addition, it has reduced its unemployment 
from 20% in the 1990s to the current 8.6%.72 A poll by Harris Interac-
tive shows that 42% of Spaniards consider immigration as beneficial 
to their country, as opposed to 19% of citizens in Britain and France.73 
This is favorable since by 2020, Spain “will need four million more 
immigrants to meet the labor demands of its growing economy.”74
Romanians are considered Spain’s best prospect for these four mil-
lion immigrants. With the fall of communism in Romania, general 
migration to Western Europe amplified. By 2000, the number of Roma-
nians living in Spain was augmented at incredible rates as established 
migration networks further facilitated migration.75 As of April 2008, 
Romanians came to comprise Spain’s largest minority,76 outnumbering 
both the Ecuadorian and Moroccan populations. In the region of Cas-
tellon, 200,000 Romanians make up 64% of the population of the city of 
La Plana, the capital.77 The implications and consequences of being the 
largest minority in Spain cannot be disregarded, involving everything 
from more businesses catering specifically to Romanians to available 
translation services. The governments of the two countries, along with 
interest groups, have created spaces for interaction, such as cultural 
events, concerts, organizations, and even a radio station78 in regions 
with large Romanian populations.
1. Strawberry Harvest
Famous for its annual strawberry harvest, the region of Huelva in 
southern Spain attracts numerous Romanian migrant workers. Roma-
nia boasts the highest number of migrant harvest contracts; of the 
40,298 foreign workers that are solicited by employers, 22,575 are 
Romanian.79 Jose Manuel Romero, president of the most prosper-
ous strawberry association in the province, Freshuelva, argues that, 
“you have to take into account that the Romanian worker is very well 
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known and appreciated in Huelva. We have worked with them in sev-
eral campaigns and the results have always been very satisfactory.”80 
Romanians, especially women, are sought after for their willingness 
to do the job for as little as 4.70€ per hour, including room and board, 
for periods of up to eight months.81 During recruitment campaigns in 
Romania, long lines are ubiquitous as the candidates vie for the lim-
ited spots. Year after year, an increasing number of Romanian workers 
outnumber other eligible immigrant groups. As a result, Moroccan 
immigrants, who previously occupied the positions, are ushered out in 
favor of workers contracted from Poland and Romania.82 While these 
decisions, rooted in racial and economic determinants, are justified by 
the fact that most Moroccans are illegal immigrants, some argue that 
Moroccans are victims of new labor exclusion, being denied access 
because of their darker skin.
Consequently, although the strawberry harvest provides temporary 
migrant work, many Romanian workers decide to stay in Spain, lead-
ing to the creation of large populations of Romanians in agricultural 
towns. These communities are sizeable enough that at times they are 
able to influence political parties, which not only acknowledge their 
presence but also make specific promises to them.83 Romanians who 
settle permanently in Spain are distinguishing themselves by their abil-
ity to rapidly learn Spanish, along with their marked Latin character, 
which has proven essential in forming part of their constructed Span-
ish society.84 Once there:
The level of integration is very high; the first thing [Romanian immi-
grants] do is learn Spanish in order to be able to work. The Romanians 
relate themselves with the orthodox churches, later they form groups of 
friends in terms of their region or work activities. They integrate them-
selves easily because the language is similar, the culture also, and the 
Latin character influences.85
Although there are many Romanian societies, and migrant workers 
often decide to live together, they are still able to integrate linguisti-
cally. The ability to read a newspaper, participate in election debates, 
and watch Spanish television enable migrant workers, especially per-
manent migrant workers, to participate in their local and national com-
munities. However, Romanians are also experiencing a multitude of 
problems. Following the 2007 Enlargement, Romanians are no longer 
considered “sin papeles” (without documents). However, bureaucratic 
Andra Boşneag
67
processes make it harder to gather the proper documents and legiti-
mize the situation of some Romanian migrants. Romanians still need 
legal Romanian papers, which pose problems to groups such as the 
Roma, who have previously entered the country without passports. At 
the same time, the migrant networks and associations that exist within 
Spain have made it increasingly easy to work in the country.86
Spain is currently plagued by a housing crisis and, in turn, this 
dilemma has acutely afflicted Romanian migrants. During September 
and October of 2007, large populations of migrant workers, mostly 
Romanians and Roma, were forced to leave their homes in the shan-
tytowns they had created on the outskirts of larger cities.87 The most 
prominent cases were seen in Madrid, where bulldozers were shown 
tearing down people’s homes. Some migrants refused to leave their 
houses. The government would not provide for the construction of 
new homes and, as a result, the people were left to start rebuilding their 
shantytowns, sometimes from the same foundations. Most of these 
people were migrant workers who could not afford proper housing. 
These actions indicate that, as a whole, Spain seems more interested in 
the labor time contributions of its immigrants than in the institutional-
ization of the migration process and meeting their basic needs.
In a recent Gallup Poll, it was shown that, on average, the percep-
tion of Romania and Romanians by Spanish citizens was more posi-
tive for those who have had direct contact with Romanians than for 
those whose perception the Spanish media had mediated.88 In addi-
tion, the media has been relentless in highlighting sensational stories 
that involve immigrants, resulting in Spaniards considering immigra-
tion their number one concern.89 These very infrequent negative acts 
gain attention and are often dragged out for days. This mostly serves 
to exacerbate tensions and prejudices between the two groups. How-
ever, since “normally any form of xenophobic behavior is condemned 
in Spanish society,”90 the hostilities usually do not lead to physical con-
frontations on a large scale.
IV. Findings
Following the 2004 EU accession, the Netherlands and Spain diverged 
on their respective policies regarding immigrant populations. Whereas 
the politicians of the former utilized an amorphous characterization 
of national identity to alienate immigrants, the government of the lat-
ter chose to legalize more than one million illegal immigrants and 
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embrace diversity. Although these overarching generalizations do not 
portray the complexities of the issue, they do point to overall trends.
Spain seems to lack the institutionalization of the migration process, 
being less involved in meeting the basic needs of its immigrants. On 
the streets of Barcelona or Madrid, one sees vagrants sleeping on dirty 
newspapers and mattresses, begging for food at restaurants, and play-
ing musical instruments on the metros for extra change. When discuss-
ing immigration in Spain, the sheer size of the recently arrived migrant 
population must be taken into consideration; Romanians alone account 
for 800,000 people. Although the government encourages immigra-
tion, it is unable to provide for most of its immigrants due to their 
vast numbers and the entangled bureaucratic processes that inhibit 
extensive civic engagement. To the advantage of immigrants, Spain as 
a whole can claim no unified identity, due to the various regions and 
autonomous states that comprise the country. Spanish identity can be 
described as fluid because many of its citizens either claim a dual or 
a single identity outside the Spanish one, e.g., Catalans or Basques. 
This facilitates the inclusion of immigrants within the Spanish culture. 
While cases of xenophobia exist, Spain seems to be preoccupied with 
Muslims in that they constitute a large portion of illegal immigration, 
rather than any threats that Islam might pose to Spanish society. There 
are other minorities in the country that seem to get more attention, for 
example, the Ecuadorians and Romanians.
On the other hand, the Netherlands is a country invested in the 
institutionalization of immigration. Neither poverty nor immigrants 
are easily on view. Most of the immigrants live in large cities, lacking 
integration into Dutch society at large. In the case of the Poles, their 
considerably smaller numbers impede them from accessing the ser-
vices provided to larger minority groups. At present, the Netherlands 
is attempting to define its national identity, an identity that does not 
seem to be as permeable as that of Spain. Anti-immigrant sentiments 
have gained popularity, stirred by several politicians. This in turn gives 
way to preoccupations with Muslims, the country’s largest minority, 
since Islam has shown itself unwilling to fit within the existing frame-
work.
Both nationalities, the Polish and the Romanians, have showcased 
an ability to blend into their respective societies, escaping under the 
radar of most anti-immigrant rhetoric. However, the Post-Enlargement 
period is still plagued by negative media portrayals, cases of xenopho-
bia, and persistent notions of the “other.” At the same time, the period 
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has also witnessed more positive interactions between migrants and 
citizens as the interaction dynamic between them has become more 
prolific. While the Pre-Enlargement time period witnessed mostly 
abstract fears of mass migration, arising in the media and govern-
ment91 and, to a lesser degree, citizens, Post-Enlargement discourse has 
been characterized by more concrete worries about migrant housing, 
schooling, and family reunification. The migrant workers occupy a 
space that demands visibility, especially in towns with a considerable 
minority. In general, this provides a greater visibility of migrants in 
society and a lessening of overall stereotypes.
Due to the lack of mass migrations, declining unemployment rates, 
and other nationalities (North Africans/Turks/ Moroccans) being 
perceived as a “far worse” cultural threat, the changes in the social 
spheres of the receiving countries seem to have been for the better, 
signaling the improved acceptance of these two groups of migrant 
workers. Unfortunately, these results cannot be generalized to other 
migrant groups. One of the reasons the Romanian and Polish migrant 
groups have become more accepted is due in part to stronger negative 
perceptions of other migrant groups, specifically Muslims and illegal 
immigrants.
In the future, lack of economic growth and unavailability of jobs 
may pose a new threat to the relationship between Spain and the Neth-
erlands and their immigrants. At the same time, in perhaps as little as 
ten years, the improvement of the economies and the rising salaries 
in Poland and Romania might encourage reverse migration and the 
stabilization of the migrants in the EU 15.92 Since EU membership is 
practically irrevocable, the newer member states have the power to 
change the EU and they will eventually cease to be seen as the “other,” 
but rather as integral members. Similarly, migrant workers are becom-
ing permanent members of the Dutch and Spanish societies, and are 
accepted by member states for the jobs they fulfill and services they 
provide, such as working for low wages and doing work that nationals 
are unwilling to perform. Further studies should focus on the effects of 
these migrations in sending countries.93
A. Revisiting Globalization
This study of transnational phenomena points to several salient global-
ization themes. Prominent is the diminishment of national borders in a 
supranational entity. Although the state continues to be the most “piv-
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otal union of global power structure,”94 able to override the fundamen-
tal laws of the EU, the Center for European Policy Studies reports that, 
“ ‘the market’ instead of ‘politics’ is becoming the prime directive when 
shaping Europe’s migration policy today.”95 This seeming precedence 
of the economic market over national politics is noteworthy for future 
development in the EU and other rising transnational organizations.
Secondly, the issue of mobility shows that due to certain factors 
(blurring of borders, cheaper transportation, etc.), “one’s own life is no 
longer tied to a particular place; it is not a staid, settled life. It is a life 
‘on the road’…a nomadic life.”96 Thus, temporary, repetitive migration 
is not only possible, but very likely. As other countries are engaging in 
EU membership discussions, this mobility will only continue to grow.
Thirdly, the concept of fortress/gated-community Europe shows 
an acceptance of an enlarged Europe over non-Western immigration. 
While it is bridging the gaps between European countries, the outer 
borders of the EU are being reinforced against the new “other” of 
Europe, Islam.97 This further reinforces a core versus periphery world 
system by the unwillingness to accept other gifted but undervalued 
citizens. Europe needs to address the changes taking place within 
its borders. Ulrich Beck’s case of Germany and globalization can be 
extended to most of Europe:
Globalization shakes to its foundations the self-image of a homogenous, 
self-contained national space calling itself the Federal Republic. It is true 
that for many years Germany has also been a global location where the 
world’s cultures and contradictions disport themselves. But till now this 
reality has been obscured in the self-image of a largely homogenous 
nation.98
These statements refer not only to a country that has 2.3 million 
Turkish immigrants but one that the UN describes as having the 
third-highest number of international migrants worldwide, ten mil-
lion immigrants. Whereas the Polish or Romanians pose an economic 
challenge, future Enlargements, such as Turkey, risk being perceived 
as “new threats…posing another or a greater challenge to boundar-
ies of morality and identity.”99 The professed homogenous religious 
identity that Europe and the EU pride themselves on stands to change. 
Yet only by not feeling threatened can the complex and nebulous con-
cept of “Europe” continue to thrive. Ultimately, only by self-critiquing 
its strengths and limitations, along with those of the other side, will 
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Europe be able to show empathy and exhibit much-needed universal-
ism in an uncertain age of globalization. •
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